**AT: Security**

**Securitization theory problematic**

**Essentialist/narrow**

**Securitization is narrow – solely focused on dominant actors and threats to security**

Šulovic, 10 --- BCSP Intern (Vladimir Šulovic, " Meaning of Security and the Theory of Securitization", 10/5/10, PDC, http://pdc.ceu.hu/archive/00006385/01/Security\_Theory\_Securitization.pdf)//EG

The securitization framework has been a useful tool to analysts who want to challenge the notion of the objectivity of security threats. The framework is elegant and has generated much academic interest and sparked the number of critiques and debates, aiming to broaden and further specify the framework in order to increase its logical coherence and explanatory power. However important and innovative contribution to our understanding of security may it be, the securitization framework is problematically narrow. First, the form of act constructing security is defined narrowly, with the main focus on the speech of dominant actors, usually political leaders, which **encourages an interpretation that securitization is only happening when there are discursive interventions of those who are institutionally legitimate to speak on behalf of a particular political community** (usually a state). This also **excludes** a focus on other forms of representations, such as **images or material practices**. (McDonald, 2008: 564). Thus, the focus is on the speech and its performative power to construct security. At the same time, the conceptual framework of securitization puts a special emphasis on the acceptance of the audience which is claimed to be essential in the successful securitization process. Contextual factors, which the Copenhagen school terms facilitating conditions, help explain why some securitizing moves are more likely to be accepted by the audience than the other. These facilitating conditions are taken as givens that either help or hinder securitization but are not conceptualized as constitutive of the speech acts, which is at odds with the claim that security is a social construction. There is tension between understanding securitization as a productive process by focusing on the performative power of the speech act, and as a constructed process by claiming that security is intersubjectively constituted. This tension gave rise to critique by the so-called Second Generation of securitization analysts who argue that securitization can not be properly understood outside historical and cultural context in which security discourse takes place. Thus, the very meaning of security is contextual. Finally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is **defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security** (McDonald, 2008: 564). This claim is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Waever, 1995: 56). Sometimes it is more effective if security is conceptualized in terms of normative goals that should be achieved or expression of the core values that are in need of being protected, than if it is articulated only in terms of “from what and from whom it needs protection”. Thus, seeing security as something negative per se does not represent a logical imperative anymore.

**Securitization’s focus on dominant voices silences marginal populations**

McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG

To date I have focused on the ‘narrowness’ of the securitization framework in analytical terms, suggesting the possibility for strengthening the framework by drawing out important elements of context and different forms of representation, for example, while also pointing to the limits and tensions within the framework that might make this difficult. I have also suggested in these contexts that it is important to avoid viewing the framework as shorthand for the broader construction of security. The question of which actors’ representations are viewed as significant within this framework, however, entails important normative commitments and has important normative implications. Put simply, the securitization framework focuses on articulations capable of leading to change in practice, with the default position being a focus on the ‘securitizations’ of political leaders who are able to achieve a wide audience in their statements and interventions, and who are able to marshal the resources of the state to respond European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 574 to the existential threat. As Wæver (1995: 57) argues, ‘security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites’. Such a focus serves to **marginalize the experiences and articulations of the powerless in global politics**, presenting them at best as part of an audience that can collectively consent to or contest securitizing moves, and at worst as passive recipients of elite discourses. In perhaps the clearest statement of this limitation, Lene Hansen (2000) has discussed the ways in which the **focus on speech acts means contributing to the silencing of women**, whose suffering and engagement with security discourses is neglected in a framework that focuses on the articulations of the powerful: of those whose voices can be heard and of those whose successful attempts at securitization can result in the enactment of emergency measures. Such a framework clearly has little to say about the plight of the most vulnerable in global politics and their experiences of — and engagement with — security and threat. Indeed for Hansen, the Copenhagen School **does not simply neglect the experiences of women but in fact serves to further marginalize them**. ‘If security is a speech act’, Hansen (2000: 306) suggests, ‘then it is simultaneously deeply implicated in the production of silence’. In many ways this focus on dominant voices in the construction of security is not a problem for the Copenhagen School alone. Traditional security proponents and some post-structuralists limit the number of actors deemed important in security terms in focusing on either state policy or dominant discourses. While Copenhagen School proponents allow the possibility for security actors and ‘securitizers’ other that state political leaders (Buzan et al., 1998: 31–3), this move is ultimately closed off by the dual suggestions that security is ultimately about states (e.g. Wæver, 1989: 314; Wæver, 1995: 47–9) and that security is articulated from a position of institutional power (Wæver, 1995: 57; Buzan et al., 1998: 32–3). The default position here is therefore a focus on the political leaders of states and their designations of threat. The methodological focus on speech acts might also be seen as relevant to this bias. As Jennifer Milliken (1999: 243–5) has argued, the tendency to ignore subjugated knowledge or voices is a general inclination within discourse analytical approaches to international relations. In short, the focus only on dominant voices and their designation of security and threat is normatively problematic, contributing to the silencing of marginal voices and ignoring the ways in which such actors have attempted precisely to contest these security constructions. But it also has problematic implications analytically. First, and echoing criticisms noted above, it pays insufficient attention to the means through which particular articulations of security and threat become possible: how, for example, are marginal actors and their articulations of security silenced or marginalized? Focusing on these marginalized or subjugated actors could point to some of the ways in McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 575 which ‘securitization’ becomes possible, expanding the emphasis on ‘contexts’ noted in the previous section. Second, it arguably encourages the particular logic of security which the Copenhagen School embraces. A range of (often marginal) actors contest dominant logics or discourses of security and threat through articulating alternative (even emancipatory) discourses of security and threat rather than simply arguing for ‘desecuritization’. Amnesty International’s campaign on human rights violations against Kurdish populations in Turkey in the 1990s, for example, particularly questioned the justification of these violations on the grounds of ‘security’. This was reflected in the title of its publication, Turkey: No Security Without Human Rights. For such actors, security (defined in non-statist, non-exclusionary and non-militaristic ways) can be a means for — or site of — emancipatory change. For the so-called Welsh School of critical security studies, focusing on the marginalized and ‘voiceless’ (Wyn Jones, 1999: 159) points to the ways in which potentially exclusionary, statist and militaristic security discourses can be challenged and replaced without simply giving up on security as a political category. Here, it could be argued that the choice within the Copenhagen School to ultimately limit attention to powerful actors and voices blinds its proponents to the role of security as a site of competing discourses or images of politics, and even potentially as a site for emancipation. Narrowness in this context has important normative implications that those using the framework would do well to reflect upon.

**ST excludes social security from its analysis and ignores how normal politics facilitate racial violence**

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19** --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

* Normal politics: pro democracy and free market govs/ govs that arent securitizing

Securitization theory similarly occludes the racial violence of normal (liberal) politics. This is not just a conceptual problem: it results in major empirical oversights. For example, though it contains the word ‘security’, securitization theory places social security outside of its frame of analysis, as part of ‘normal politics’: ‘Although it shares some qualities with “social security,” or security as applied to various civilian guard or police functions, international security has its own distinctive, more extreme meaning. Unlike social security, which has strong links to matters of entitlement and social justice, international security is more firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 21). **Securitization theory overlooks the power politics of social security and cannot see how Western welfare state social security systems support white (settler) heteropatriarchal forms of life**, such as the nuclear family ([Arvin et al., 2013](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Cohen, 1997](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Duggan, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Kandaswamy, 2008](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)), and disproportionately target racialized, indigenous, and poor communities for direct and violent interventions such as the removal of children from families through enslavement, the residential schools that formed part of the genocide of indigenous people, child welfare systems, migrant detention and removal, and so on. Closer to Copenhagen: Denmark now uses socialized daycare as a means for removing and assimilating Muslim children ([Salem, 2018](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). Social and national security are imbricated. For example, current Islamophobic counter-terrorism programs often use social and health services to identify suspected ‘terrorists’ ([Kundnani, 2014](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Qurashi, 2018](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Qureshi, 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). Social security only entails ‘entitlement and social justice’ for those privileged by whiteness, heterosexuality, citizenship, and/or class status. Securitization theory’s civilizationist idealization of ‘normal politics’ occludes these dynamics.

**ST makes it impossible to understand how securitizations manifests in different contexts by not analyzing the position of the audience**

McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG

* Not the speech act that matters but the reaction – instead of critiquing the lang of the 1ac they should be analyzing reactions to it -

Related to the above focus on the role of linguistic practices, it is also possible to argue that the securitization framework is problematically narrow in McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 571 its focus on the speech act relative to the social and political context in which the act itself occurs. Indeed, this is a problem acknowledged (but not fundamentally redressed) in Buzan et al. (1998).12 Put simply, in developing a universal framework for the designation or construction of threat through speech acts the Copenhagen School ultimately downplays the importance of contextual factors — such as dominant narratives of identity — that condition both patterns of securitization and the broader construction of security. This is particularly curious given that Wæver has explored these contexts in detail elsewhere, linking security perspectives and actions to narratives of history and identity in European contexts (Wæver, 1996; Hansen and Wæver, 2001). To the extent that there is engagement with the context of the speech act in the Copenhagen School, it has come in three central forms. The first is to suggest that we can see dynamics of securitization playing out in different ‘sectors’. For these theorists, the designation of threat looks different in the context of military concerns than environmental ones, for example. Perhaps most prominent in these distinctions is that between societal and state sectors (Wæver et al., 1993), the former defined in terms of the preservation of preferred identities and the latter in terms of the preservation of sovereignty (usually defined as non-intervention). This draws an important analytical distinction between often conflated referents of nation and state. However, the division between sectors does not go far enough in recognizing context, focusing only on different dynamics of securitization across different issue areas rather than on the processes through which these security referents are themselves given meaning. And as Roxanne Lynn Doty argues (1998/9), drawing meaningful analytical distinctions between these sectors is sometimes difficult and often unhelpful. Political leaders can and do simultaneously invoke sovereignty and identity as that in need of preservation, and attempting to compartmentalize security dynamics can obscure broader forms of discursive continuity in approaches to issues as disparate as immigration, environmental change and traditional military practices in particular historical or social contexts.13 The second form of engagement with contextual factors concerns the role of so-called ‘facilitating conditions’, referring to those dynamics, developments and institutional contexts that enable ‘securitizing moves’ to become successful. Here, Ole Wæver (2000: 252–3), echoing the discussion in Buzan et al. (1998: 31–3), has identified the importance of the form of the speech act; the role of the securitizing actor; and the ‘conditions historically associated with that threat’. The recognition of the latter two of these conditions — most prominently the third — certainly moves towards addressing the role of context. The problem here is more simply that this potentially important insight — which takes us beyond a set of strict criteria to be met in terms of the act of securitizing — is not incorporated within the securitization European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 572 framework itself, which **focuses overwhelmingly on the peformative role of the speech act rather than the conditions in which securitization itself becomes possible** (Buzan and Wæver, 2003: 72). It is not a coincidence that this dimension of the securitization framework remains under-theorized: examining historical ‘experiences’ with threat designation calls for a looser and highly interpretative approach to analysis which potentially conflicts with the development of a neat and coherent set of ‘requirements’ to be met for securitization. Finally, the securitization framework engages with contextual factors in acknowledging the role of audiences and the importance of security pronouncements being ‘backed up’. This recognition would seem to be central to the broader recognition of the importance of context in the designation of security and threat, but there are two limitations here. The first is that, quite simply, what being ‘backed up’ means, how we know when it happens and what the implications are when it does not are radically under-theorized in the Copenhagen School. While recognizing that security is inter-subjectively constructed, the focus on the speech act as performing security arguably paints security less as a site of negotiation than one of articulation. Thierry Balzacq (2005) has suggested that the role of audiences is underspecified because of Wæver’s reliance on Austin’s theorization of language. Here, the work is done by the articulation itself rather than the result of a negotiation between the articulator and the audience at whom the articulation is directed. More specifically, the power of the speech act would appear to be undermined by the full incorporation of the idea that the act itself is only one part of the securitizing process: that it relies upon the acquiescence, consent or support of particular constituencies. There are certainly opportunities here for counter-readings on this point. While retaining an emphasis on the productive nature of speech, Judith Butler (1997), for example, has suggested that Austin’s conception of the speech act implies the possibility that they can be either ‘perlocutionary’ (necessary for enabling particular actions) or ‘illocutionary’ (performing a function at the moment of speech). Allowing the possibility that speech acts are perlocutionary potentially enables greater attention to audiences who might either consent to particular actions suggested through speech or engage in contesting the terms of the speech act or the actions suggested in response to it (Butler, 1997: 15). An alternative interpretation of the speech act might be that it serves to construct or produce the audience itself.14 Further, it might be suggested that the role audiences play is in helping to constitute speech communities in which particular forms of representation are intelligible and legitimate and others unintelligible and illegitimate (e.g. Fierke, 1997). These are all particular readings of the ‘speech act’ that at some level constitute attempts to come to terms with the production–construction distinction, McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 573 what Holger Stritzel (2007) has defined as an ‘internalist–externalist’ distinction. The challenge for the securitization framework in this sense is that the above are quite different in their conception of what speech acts are and how they relate to audiences. There is a **clear need to** **clarify the position** on the above points to draw the role **of audiences** into the framework more coherently, but in doing so the Copenhagen School will almost certainly need to downplay either the performative effects of the speech act or the inter-subjective nature of security.15 Ultimately, those interested in the construction of security must pay attention to the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security (even those defined narrowly in terms of the designation and articulation of threat) become possible. Why are some political communities more likely to view certain actors and dynamics as threatening? What role do narratives of history, culture and identity have in underpinning or legitimating particular forms of securitization? To what extent is political possibility defined by the target audience of speech acts? How are some voices empowered or marginalized to define security and threat? These highly contextual factors, I would suggest, are **central to understanding how security works in different contexts, but are ultimately given short shrift in the securitization framework**. The appeal of universalism in the development of a conceptual framework goes some way towards explaining the neglect of contextual factors, but the failure also to draw out the ways in which securitizing actors and audiences interact beyond the broad and amorphous recognition of ‘facilitating conditions’ and being ‘backed up’ by relevant audiences is unsatisfying.

**ST’s focus on threats only tells a partial story of how security gets meaning and is based on a logic of exclusion which reifys statis and militaristic approaches to security**

McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG

In the securitization framework, the study of security is ultimately the study of the designation of threat. In this framework, an issue is a security issue if European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 578 positioned as a threat to a particular political community. This commitment to the study of ‘threats’ is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Wæver, 1995: 56). Such a commitment is consistent also with the oppositional conception of identity in the securitization framework, wherein who we are is determined by the designation of (threatening) others.21 In short, we can learn all we need to know about the construction of security through studying the issues that are represented as existential threats. As Michael Williams (2003) has suggested, this oppositional view of the politics of security is related to the Copenhagen School’s indebtedness to the political theory of Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, politics in general is characterized by enmity and exclusion, with the sovereign’s designation of threatening ‘others’ central to political life and allowing the ‘exception’: the suspension of the normal rules of politics. For the securitization framework, such a vision of politics is particularly applicable to the realm of security, which is characterized by the articulation of threat and ‘emergency measures’ enabled by that articulation. The Copenhagen School suggests that this political dynamic captures something timeless about the logic of security itself, with the realm of security an arena of exclusion and ‘panic politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). This view of the logic of security has been central to their call for desecuritization, a point I will return to in a moment. Representations of threat — pivotal to Schmittian security politics — can of course be viewed as constitutive of security and identity. As Simon Dalby has argued, the designation of that from which we need to be protected is crucial in telling us ‘who we are, what we value and what we are prepared to countenance to protect our self-preferred identities’ (Dalby, 2002: xxx). But is this the only way in which security is constructed, and what do we miss through focusing only on the designation of threat? I suggest here that while central, a focus on the designation of threat alone risks missing much about the construction of security, especially through privileging the ‘content’ of security over its meaning in particular contexts. As noted, Roxanne Lynn Doty (1998/9) has suggested that radically different approaches to immigration can be understood in the context of different discourses of security. For Doty, changing approaches to the treatment of Haitian refugees by the US government in the 1990s can primarily — and contra the Copenhagen School — be understood as a change in the way security itself was understood. And I have suggested elsewhere (McDonald, 2003) that significant change in the Brazilian government’s approach to Amazonian deforestation in the late 1980s — from conceptualizing the intact rainforest as a threat to Brazil to positioning it as that in need of being protected as part of Brazil — can be better understood as a change in perceptions McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 579 or discourses of security rather than as an instance of ‘de-securitization’. Here, articulations of the values in need of being protected were more prominent — and I would suggest more politically significant — than articulations of ‘from what or whom we need protection’. The **focus on the designation of threat alone therefore tells a partial story of how security is given meaning, marginalizing inclusive and non-statist definitions of ‘our values’ that tell us how security is understood in particular contexts**.22 More problematically, the Copenhagen School image of security as acquiring meaning (or more accurately content) through the articulation of threat arguably works only to the extent that **security is fixed in a Schmittian logic based on exclusion and exception**.23 The ‘fixedness’ of the Copenhagen School’s logic of security has been taken up by ‘Welsh School’ critical security theorists, for whom the study of security should be geared towards recognizing and advancing opportunities for emancipation of the most vulnerable. Ken Booth (2005: 207) and Paul Williams (2004: 144), for example, have suggested that the securitization framework is parasitic upon traditional (Realist) discourses of security that are taken as indicative of a universal and timeless logic of security. This is evident, for these theorists, in the Copenhagen School’s commitment to strict boundaries of inclusion and exclusion; to the state and state political leaders’ centrality in defining (usually external) threats and responses to them; and to the association of security means and tools with the most significant of ‘emergency measures’: military action. This constitutes an important normative problem, arguably **serving to reify and normalize these traditional statist, exclusionary and militaristic approaches to security**. Indeed, the idea that the Copenhagen School’s logic of security is both relatively fixed and politically conservative is a feature of even sympathetic readings of the securitization framework (Huysmans, 1998: 500–1; Hansen, 2000: 286). In this context, key proponents of the Copenhagen School (Wæver, 1995; 2000: 253; 2004; Buzan et al., 1998: 204–9) have argued in favour of desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. While recognizing the possibility for securitization to be progressive (eg Wæver, 2000: 285), the general suggestion is that ‘it is better . . . to aim for desecuritization’ (Buzan and Wæver, 1998: 4). Here, the Schmittian logic of security can be avoided and issues returned to the open and deliberative realm of normal politics. Important issues surface again here about what constitutes normal politics and about the relatively simplistic distinction between ‘security’ and ‘politics’. Analytically, it is certainly possible to suggest that rather than constituting the opposite realm to that of politics, debates around what constitutes security and how ‘we’ should act to achieve or preserve it are particularly politically intense, even a form of ‘hyper-politics’. The logic of security upon which the securitization framework is based might be contested again here, 579 European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 580 most prominently the suggestion that security ‘speech acts’ can themselves take issues outside the political realm. But the suggestion that we should aim for ‘desecuritization’ is also normatively problematic. It **depicts security as a failure of ‘normal politics’ rather than recognizing security as a site of contestation and therefore for** (even emancipatory) **change**. This is especially important if security is still that most powerful of political categories — defining political priority, a community’s identity and its core values. The focus only on the negative designation of threat serves the interests of those who benefit from dominant negative and exclusionary articulations of threat in contemporary international politics, further **silencing voices articulating alternative visions for what security means and how it might be realized.**

**Securitization theory neglects the political effects of colonialism and race in its analysis of the construction of threats – doesn’t account for consequences and the intrinsic violence of securitizing**

**Selister Gomes and Rodrigues Marques, 21** --- Mariana Selister Gomes is an associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences, of the Post-Graduation Program in Social Sciences and of the Post-Graduation Program in International Relations of the Federal University of Santa Maria. Collaborating Professor of the Post-Graduation Program in Sociology of the Federal University of Sergipe. Doctor in Sociology at the Lisbon University Institute. Master in Sociology by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and Bachelor in History by the same institution. Renata Rodrigues Marques is a teacher in International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM). Graduated in International Relations from the same institution. Member of the GIDH Extension Project - Gender, Intersectionality and Human Rights and of the Feminist and Decolonial Research Methodology Research Project. (Mariana Selister Gomes and Renata Rodrigues Marques, "Can securitization theory be saved from itself? A decolonial and feminist intervention", 10-26-2021, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)//EG

The relationship between ontological perceptions and definitions of threat has been a topic of discussion in security studies for at least two decades. At first, securitization theory was considered an innovation in this area, since it maintains that security issues are constructed as such not from the recognition of threats but from securitization acts themselves, through a ‘self-referential practice’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795): 204) related to intersubjective and shared understandings about security. When securitization theory has no ontological assumptions, its critical capacity enables reflections on power relations (for example, coloniality and gender) that are reflected in the ‘speech acts’ produced in the construction of a threat by a securitizing actor. However, some criticism has been voiced regarding the character of the theory and its possibilities as a critical perspective ([Bertrand, 2018](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Hansen, 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). It has been argued that the concept of securitization itself presupposes power dynamics that underlie the very ability to securitize through speech acts, so it does not include the subaltern as an actor in security speech. We identify a problem of silence due to limited social representation, where people who are classified socially in relation to their race, gender and class are portrayed as objects to be protected or threats to be prevented, in a securitizing vocabulary. This is related to a social imaginary where they are portrayed as victims or transgressors ([Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). This can be seen in empirical studies of the process of desecuritization of female combatants in the pacification of Sierra Leone ([MacKenzie, 2009](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) and in the finding, in a study that draws openly on the concept of intersectionality, that refugee women are constructed as vulnerable while male refugees are presented as a threat in the British media ([Gray and Franck, 2019](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). The silencing is not a failure of securitization theory per se. [Buzan and Hansen (2009](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795): 19) even claim that international security studies has a ‘history of Anglo-centric (and militaristic and patriarchal) bias’. Hence, our first argument is that the racist and patriarchal character of securitization theory also permeates security studies and the field of international relations ([Taylor, 2012](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Vitalis, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)), **because it permeates the production of knowledge as a whole**. **It is a product of coloniality and the perpetuation of whiteness** ([Quijano, 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Ware and Back, 2001](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Neglect of certain dimensions and categories of analysis (especially race and gender) is disguised as a supposed neutrality and as a methodological choice regarding the analysis of speech acts. Thus, desecuritized themes are banished to the sphere of so-called normal politics ([Wæver, 1995](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) without any recognition that this strategy does not take into account the intrinsic violence of normal politics ([Bertrand, 2018](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Moffette and Vadasaria, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Opitz, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Moreover, the Copenhagen School **fails to realize that gender and race issues are not always related to the societal security sector and may be linked to the political security of states** ([Hansen, 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Critical security studies has advanced reflection on security problems regarding the exposure of groups of individuals in situations of insecurity and practices of (in)securitization ([Bigo, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)), and has introduced normative debates on the use of speech and/or practices to understand security ([Hansen, 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Many of the contributions to securitization theory, especially in relation to the context and the audience of the securitization process ([Balzacq, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Léonard and Kaunert, 2011](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)), have been put to good use in research that aims to analyze the social configurations of power in such processes. Accordingly, our concept of securitization starts from the understanding of the classical perspective – that a securitized problem is the intersubjective construction of an existential threat. However, we build on the basis of a ‘sociological’ turn in securitization studies that realizes that this process is established as an instrument of political disputes and government practices ([Balzacq, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Opitz, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). In this sense, we understand and endorse many of the epistemological criticisms of classical securitization theory, recognizing the perspective that characterizing non-Western cases as cases of securitization may constitute a simplification of more complex sociopolitical processes ([Wilkinson, 2007](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). There are geopolitical limitations in the theoretical constructions that permeate the area of security studies, from its beginnings to contemporary times. We also realize that the ‘periphery’ of knowledge production ([Tickner, 2013](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) has not been included as a reflection on either side of recent debates ([Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Wæver and Buzan, 2020](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Still, there is a critical potential to expand the analysis that considers the social classification of people in securitization studies, including its geopolitical dimensions. We want to emphasize that studies that use the concept of securitization to demonstrate inequalities of power in empirical processes have been conducted for some time (see [Gray and Franck, 2019](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Hirschauer, 2014](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Ibrahim, 2005](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [MacKenzie, 2009](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Moffette and Vadasaria, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Saeed, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Our concern is that these studies were intentionally ignored in the critique of ‘classical’ theory by [Howell and Richter-Montpetit (2020)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795), although much of the literature that adopts the concept of securitization generally recognizes its limitations and tries to overcome them, usually by modifying it, to the point that we can speak of ‘theories of securitization’ in the plural ([Balzacq, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). In a sense, at least the controversy over racism in securitization theory has brought the required attention of [Wæver and Buzan (2020)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795) to this debate, where (in the long answer) they recognize some of the work that has been done in the field on race, racism and securitization. Having overcome the limitations of analyzing colonial structures and gender and race discourses, we recognize the potential for critical security studies of having securitization as a tool, while researchers have the possibility of politicizing securitization ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795): 35). Critical approaches can demonstrate that when we analyze government discourses in relation to groups of individuals, whether they are recognized as citizens or foreigners, to criminalize is to securitize. **Securitization theory has neglected the political effects of colonialism and race as relevant categories to be analyzed in the construction of threats** ([Moffette and Vadasaria, 2016](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). We understand social classification processes such as genderization and racialization should have a central role in the theory, since their **insertion would complexify the understanding of power relations involved in the securitization process, as well as the consequences of being securitized – and of being marginalized – in that process**. So far, however, coloniality, race, and gender have not had a prominent role in securitization theory.

**The analysis of the securitization process doesn’t account for patriarchal and colonial power – can’t understand the dynamics of international security**

**Selister Gomes and Rodrigues Marques, 21** --- Mariana Selister Gomes is an associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences, of the Post-Graduation Program in Social Sciences and of the Post-Graduation Program in International Relations of the Federal University of Santa Maria. Collaborating Professor of the Post-Graduation Program in Sociology of the Federal University of Sergipe. Doctor in Sociology at the Lisbon University Institute. Master in Sociology by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and Bachelor in History by the same institution. Renata Rodrigues Marques is a teacher in International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM). Graduated in International Relations from the same institution. Member of the GIDH Extension Project - Gender, Intersectionality and Human Rights and of the Feminist and Decolonial Research Methodology Research Project. (Mariana Selister Gomes and Renata Rodrigues Marques, "Can securitization theory be saved from itself? A decolonial and feminist intervention", 10-26-2021, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)//EG

As [Wæver (1995](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795): 57) has observed, the securitization process is related to power dynamics: mainly the power of elites to establish threats and objects to be referenced and protected. [Balzacq’s (2015)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795) interpretation also recognizes that securitization is made possible by a situation in which the securitizing agent has the power to securitize; therefore it is hierarchical. This allows us to acknowledge the possibilities and limitations of securitization as a discourse and as a practice of power. Nevertheless, patriarchal ([Pateman, 1988](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) and colonial ([Mignolo, 2001](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) power have not yet been incorporated as central elements in the analysis of securitization processes. Decolonial studies has been instrumental in exposing that traditional theorists understand power less well than they believe, since they obscure and exclude much of the existing power dynamics from analysis and ignore hierarchies. The decolonial turn recognizes that specific historical conditions are constituting processes that classify people and states socially and subjectively within world capitalism and colonial logic ([Quijano, 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Similarly, gender is produced and propagated through speech, which in turn are causally related to the power relations between individuals, groups, and states, as well as the functioning of the capitalist production system and international security dynamics ([Gentry and Sjoberg, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). While the roots of security studies are intertwined with international relations, it is understood as bordering different disciplines, so it can potentially engage with other areas ([Buzan and Hansen, 2009](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Consequently, it is possible to bring security studies closer to the discussions of coloniality as configurations of power. Although we have not found studies that used decolonial feminism to theorize about securitization or critical security studies, we realize that it has the potential to address many of the limitations we identify. The **concept of intersectionality is essential for understanding the main structures of modern society – patriarchy, racism, and capitalism – that demarcate people’s lives and political processes, and, consequently, the dynamics of international security**. These social structures that interact with each other create the categories of women, race, and class ([Davis, 1981](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) that segregate and hierarchize social groups. In dialogue with intersectional theory, decolonial feminism ([Lugones, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) places these three dimensions in an international perspective, emphasizing the idea of coloniality. Thus, patriarchy, racism, and capitalism are the main social structures strongly demarcated by historical colonialism and its roots in the economy, politics and culture that persist to the present day, establishing what Lugones defines as the ‘colonial/modern gender system’. Although these concepts can lead to different paths of analysis, their epistemological common ground allows us to advocate that coloniality, racialization, and genderization are products of historical constructions, neither universal nor essential. Culturally and historically situated analysis of securitization processes has the capacity to incorporate social classification configurations such as racialization and genderization, although we do not see this happening very often. We intend to illustrate in the next section how the conduct of empirical research plays a decisive role in efforts to analyze the social configurations of power in securitization processes.

**Flawed Epistemology**

**Securitization theory is based on the racist concept of the social contract and cites authors who either justify racism or ignore it**

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19** --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

In this section, we describe how civilizationist thought underpins securitization theory’s concepts of politics and security. Civilizationism is a term used to describe racist (theoretical) perspectives that contain three assumptions: (1) Civilizations can, and ought to, advance, and some (Western) civilizations are more ‘advanced’; (2) civilizational progress is not only technological and material, but political and moral; and (3) the ‘underdevelopment’ of certain civilizations represents a problem for, or threat to, developed ones. Drawing on a broad canon of civilizationist political philosophy, canonical securitization theory texts develop a narrative of world-historical progress in which civilizational advancement beyond the violence of ‘primal anarchy’ involves curtailing securitization through the instantiation of civilized ‘normal politics’. Classic securitization theory frequently and favorably cites Samuel Huntington’s racist ([Said, 2001](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)) ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 36, 53, 112, 125) and Robert Kaplan ([Buzan and Wæver, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 221, 252; [Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 47, 54, 69–70, 112, 127), infamous for his theory of ‘the coming anarchy’, his warnings of the danger of ‘tribalism’, his neo-Malthusian arguments about ‘overpopulation’ in the global South ([Kaplan, 1994](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921), [2000](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)), and his defense of ‘tempered imperialism’ ([Kaplan, 2014](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). Social theorists such as Durkheim, who built his theory of society on racist anthropological distinctions between civilized men and savages ([Elias and Feagin, 2016](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)), also feature ([Wæver, 1995](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 67). Perhaps more fundamentally, securitization theory draws on social contract thinkers such as Hobbes (see [Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 69, 209; [Wæver, 1995](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 54) for their ‘state of nature’ concept (Sbisà in [Wæver, 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 121). [Mills (1997)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921) has convincingly argued that racism is integral, not incidental, to social contract theory,[1](javascript:popRef('fn1-0967010619862921')) which typically casts the social contract as an achievement of Western civilization and locates the contrasting ‘state of nature’ in African ‘tribes’ or indigenous ‘savages’ ([Mills, 1997](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 13). Securitization theory extends social contract theory to cast ‘normal politics’ (and the curbing of securitization) as an achievement of civilization. ‘Primal anarchy’ and the ‘state of nature’ act as the foils to this ‘normal politics’ in a teleological hierarchy of civilizational advancement from securitization towards politicization ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 53, 69). Following Hobbes, securitization theory locates this supposed progress in the West, particularly Europe: It perhaps begins with the construction of the Hobbesian state in the eighteenth century. The creation of the Leviathan was aimed at opening a sphere of public economic and political life, and this could not be done without pushing the use of force back into a contained space controlled by the state. Under the Leviathan, citizens could not draw swords over economic grievances or political disagreements, which were to be handled by the rule of law and the market. The logic of existential threat and the right to use force … were reserved to the state and thus were largely *desecuritized* among the citizens. ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 209, emphasis added) The social contract, for securitization theory, is an (18th-century, white, European, liberal) feat of desecuritization, both within nation-states and among them ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 51).[2](javascript:popRef('fn2-0967010619862921')) **Securitization theory**, then, **does not merely replicate social contract theory and civilizationist thought: it develops it.** By introducing a constructivist methodology, securitization theory places politicization (the instantiation of ‘normal politics’ or social contracts) and *minimizing securitization* as integral to civilizational progress. Admittedly, securitization theory is an eclectic theory. In addition to thinkers easily identified as civilizationist, it also draws on apparently more critical theorists, notably Arendt. Responding to Foucauldian critiques that describe securitization theory’s conceptualization of security as the exception to politics as Schmittian, [Wæver (2011](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 470) argues that these critics have misunderstood: ‘it is wrong to claim … that securitization theory involves a “Schmittian” concept of politics – the theory has a Schmittian concept of security and an Arendtian concept of politics’, further clarifying that: The concept of *security* is Schmittian, because it defines security in terms of exception, emergency, and a decision (although not by a singular will, but among people in a political situation). This does not in itself make securitization theory’s concept of *politics* Schmittian, because the place of security in the theory is as an anti-politics or the politically constituted limit to politics. This general politics is inspired by Hannah Arendt. ([Wæver, 2011](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 478) Elsewhere, [Wæver (2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 122) summarizes Arendt’s concept of politics: ‘politics takes place among people, in-between us, because power only emerges when people act together, it basically consists of action directed to and dependent on the reaction of others, not doing things directly’. Here, he adverts to Arendt’s distinction between power (*Macht*) and violence (*Gewalt*), which securitization theory mirrors by dividing politicization from securitization. Arendt drew on racist German anthropology that distinguished between (uncivilized) ‘nature people’ (*Naturvölker*) and (civilized) ‘cultured people’ (*Kulturvölker*) ([Klausen, 2010](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Owens, 2017](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)) to divide the world into communities with history, language, and political institutions, and those without ([Klausen, 2010](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 396). She cast the former as (morally and politically) superior and warned that the latter’s ‘primitivism’ posed a threat to political freedom and democracy. When securitization theory adopts Arendt’s concept of politics, it does not dispense with her civilizationism but replicates and develops it, conceptualizing ‘normal politics’ as the achievement of civilized people capable of resisting violence (securitization) through reasoned dialogue (politicization). Securitization theory also replicates Arendt’s evacuation of violence from politics. Arendt built her idea of power (*Macht*) on an idealized vision of the Athenian *polis*, ignoring the ‘raw materials’ of ancient Athenian democracy – slave labor and women’s unpaid reproductive labor ([James, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 249f). She similarly idealized the American republic ([Gines, 2014](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [James, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Johnson, 2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Owens, 2017](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). Although in her famous ‘boomerang thesis’ [Arendt (1979)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921) located the origins of Nazism in European racism and colonialism, she asserted that the USA had never been guilty of imperialism or indigenous genocide (see [James, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Johnson, 2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). Though she spoke out against Nazi white supremacy in Europe, she insisted US racism was merely a *social* phenomenon, not a *political* structure ([James, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 253; [Johnson, 2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)), even though Nazi policies were explicitly inspired by US settler-colonial genocide, the reservation system, and Jim Crow segregation ([Cesaire, 1950](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Fanon, 1967](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [James, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Whitman, 2017](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). In praising ancient Athens and contemporary America, Arendt actively minimized the imperial, racialized, and gendered violence structuring these ‘civilized’ democracies ([Allen, 2001](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Gines, 2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921), [2014](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [James, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Johnson, 2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Norton, 1995](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)).

**ST facilitates civilizationist beliefs by utilizing racist ideas of state failure and attributing normal politics to European civilization and securitization with a return to primal anarchy**

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19** --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

Classic securitization theory is civilizationist in that it believes that there are more or less politically and morally developed civilizations. It **identifies ‘normal politics’ with (European) civilization and ‘securitization’ with a return to (racialized) primal anarchy**. As a result, it **depicts ‘underdeveloped’ civilizations as threats to supposedly more advanced ones**. This becomes especially clear when examining securitization theory’s ideas about ‘state failure’. Securitization theory claims that in ‘developed’ states ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 28) a civilized political sphere generally fends off securitization, except when ‘securitization is unavoidable, as when states are faced with an implacable or barbarian aggressor’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 29). By contrast, in ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ states securitization runs amok: ‘In well-developed states, armed forces and intelligence services are carefully separated from normal political life, and their use is subject to elaborate procedures of authorization. Where such separation is not in place, as in many weak states … much of normal politics is pushed into the security realm’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 28). This excessive securitization, in turn, leads to primal (or ‘Hobbesian’ or ‘Kaplanesque’) anarchy, wherein the state ‘fails to take root or spirals into disintegration. This situation can lead to prolonged periods of *primal anarchy*, as is currently the case in Afghanistan and various parts of Africa, in which the state is only a shadow and reality is one of rival warlords and gangs’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 50, emphasis added; for analysis of the colonial preoccupation with Afghan ‘tribes’, see [Manchanda, 2018](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). **Discourses of state failure are ‘irredeemably rooted in an imperial and racialized imagination**’ ([Gruffydd Jones, 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 65; see also [Grovogui, 2001](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Shilliam, 2013](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Wai, 2012a](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921), [2012b](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). While they may avoid overt reference to race, they operate within a lineage of racial discourse that emerged to justify colonialism and continuing trusteeship. This racial hierarchy is fully represented in securitization theory’s list of weak and failing states: Nigeria under Abacha, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, and ‘various parts of Africa’, the USSR under Stalin, Bosnia, Colombia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and so on (see [Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 28, 50, 69, 146). This is a racial discourse: ‘primal anarchy’ is primarily located in ‘brown’ (‘Afghanistan’) and ‘black’ (‘parts of Africa’) regions. Copenhagen School theorists sometimes seem to be aware of how this division falls. This does not lead them to question it. On the contrary, they warn against Western-centrism, but only in order to emphasize that it is in the West that ‘normal’ civilized politics exists: ‘if domestic and international were fixed, there would be a risk of generating a cozy Western view of politics: Domestic politics is normal and without security, whereas the extreme is relegated to the international space. In other parts of the world, domestic is not cozy’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 47n7). For securitization theory, primal anarchy exists, not only in the international realm, but also in non-Western ‘other parts of the world’, where a failure of normal politics leads to ‘“tribalist” forms of association’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 69). Securitization theory refuses to seriously consider the role of modern colonialism and ongoing imperial warfare in ‘failed states’. Such consideration might reveal the significance of Western colonial divide-and-rule policies, extraction of resources and labor, imposition of state borders, and military and covert intervention. Instead, securitization theory frames ‘failed states’ as evidence of a primal state of nature. Civilizationism is not just a collateral, detachable, part of securitization theory’s imaginary, or a sadly unattended-to implication of its Kaplanesque view of anarchy or its Arendtian model of politics. The idea that there has been (white) civilizational progress away from (racialized) primal anarchy is omnipresent in securitization theory because it is fundamental to securitization theory’s opposition between politicization and securitization. Ungrounded in the racist and civilizationist narrative that ‘normal politics’ emerged from ‘primal anarchy’, this opposition would look as arbitrary as it in fact is.

**ALT fails - The framework of ST problematically excludes images and physical act which maintains communications of security in the squo**

McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG

For the Copenhagen School, issues become security issues (or more accurately threats) through language. It is language that positions specific actors or issues as existentially threatening to a particular political community, thus enabling (or indeed constituting, depending on interpretation) securitization. Indeed, rather than simply being one ‘site’ of security construction, Wæver (1995) located securitization itself in language theory, and particularly Austin’s articulation of the ‘speech act’. In this framework, language itself becomes security in the sense that particular forms of language — spoken or written in a particular context — constitute security. As Wæver argued (1995: 55), ‘the utterance itself is the act . . . by uttering “security”, a staterepresentative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it’. This reliance on language as the exclusive form of ‘securitizing move’ is problematic for two reasons. First, language is only one (albeit the most central) means through which meaning is communicated (Möller, 2007: 180). A range of authors in this context have suggested the need to take account of the role of images as potential forms of securitization. Second, an exclusive McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 569 focus on language is problematic in the sense that it can exclude forms of bureaucratic practices or physical action that do not merely follow from securitizing ‘speech acts’ but are part of the process through which meanings of security are communicated and security itself constructed. As noted, a range of authors have suggested that images or visual representations can be central to the construction of security generally or even securitization specifically. Michael Williams (2003) has suggested that television images of 11 September — and in particular those of the World Trade Center towers — were central to the development of dominant perceptions of security and threat in the American context. Frank Möller (2007) also discusses visual representations of the 11 September attacks — along with conflict in Iraq — in pointing to the ways in which **photographic exhibitions are similarly able to communicate particular meanings of security and threat**. Lene Hansen (2007), meanwhile, uses the example of the cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad published in a Danish newspaper in 2005 in pointing to the potentially central role of visual representations as forms of securitization. Extending the securitization framework to include these forms of representation (as Williams suggests) would certainly be more reflective of the range of forms through which meaning — including about security and threat — can be communicated. But such inclusion may not be as simple as it appears. At a general level, the centrality of Austin’s theory of language to the broader framework suggests the need for developing or building on an alternative theory of the performative role of security representations. More specifically, the challenge for the Copenhagen School here may be that visual representations raise difficult questions about agency, intentionality and the importance of contestation over meaning. While the classical application of the securitization framework has focused on the role of political leaders in the articulation and designation of threat, in the above examples of visual representation the key ‘securitizing actors’ are artists and the media. Incorporating visual representation into the securitization framework, therefore, may involve simultaneously rethinking the centrality that state political elite have in the framework itself. The role of intentionality is important in this context. Copenhagen School proponents portray a securitizing move as a highly intentional, strategic action. Buzan et al. (1998: 21) argue that the designation of ‘threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them’, further noting that the ‘invocation of security has been the key to legitimizing the use of force’ (my emphases). More directly, Wæver (1995: 63) has argued that ‘the logic around which the whole issue of security has been framed’ is ‘among strategic actors imbued with intentionality’. Such an image of strategic actors seeking to justify emergency responses arguably fits poorly with the communication of visual images, undertaken by actors (such as the media) less likely to be seeking to engage European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 570 in particular emergency measures or in a position to undertake them. And as Möller (2007: 185) and Hansen (2007) have argued, images are ambiguous in meaning, making it harder to control the meaning others take away from them. This renders the strategic use of images more difficult, while also pointing to the importance of contestation over meaning central to security politics. An alternative argument concerning the ‘narrowness’ of the Copenhagen School’s exclusive focus on speech is advanced by Didier Bigo (2002) and the so-called ‘Paris School’.9 For these theorists, security is constructed and applied to different issues and areas through a range of often routinized practices rather than only through specific speech acts that enable emergency measures. Practices of surveillance and border controls, for example, particularly as undertaken by bureaucrats or ‘professional managers of unease’ (Bigo, 2002: 65), are a central part of securitization, and are not simply those actions enabled by preceding speech acts. For these theorists, ‘to attend to the study of securitization is to focus on the creation of networks of professionals of (in)security, the systems of meaning they generate and the productive power of their practices’ (Case Collective, 2006: 458). This stands in opposition to the conception of security in the securitization framework, in which security practices follow speech acts and in which security is the realm of dramatic emergency measures. Recognizing the role of apparently mundane and everyday physical actions in the construction of security serves to question the speech-physical action sequence of the securitization framework and points to the multiple forms in which meaning can be communicated. The ‘everyday practices’ of the ‘managers of unease’, for example, would seem destined to be excluded from the securitization framework, reliant as it is on a conception of the politics– security relationship that emphasizes the extraordinary forms of action that follow from the construction of threats through speech. This maps on to criticisms raised by Hansen (2000: 300–1) and Wilkinson (2007) that the Copenhagen School framework problematically neglects physical action generally, action which can serve to communicate ideas about security in their own right.10 It is far more possible to envisage images and visual representation being drawn into the securitization framework as forms of ‘securitizing moves’, a project advocated and furthered by Williams (2003) and Hansen (2007) respectively.11 But even here there are challenges, not least of all related to the questions of ambiguity, intentionality and the traditional centrality of speech and the speech act to the framework itself.

**Racist**

**ST seeks to prevent western order form falling into a state of nature which maintains the colonial system of global inequality**

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19** --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

We have established that securitization theory is founded in a civilizationist conceptualization of politics and security that occludes racial and colonial violence. We now demonstrate that, on the basis of these assumptions, securitization theory develops a methodologically and normatively white theory. As postcolonial, critical race, and feminist scholarship argues, methodology involves making choices about whose perspectives or histories we (de)value. [Bhambra (2017)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921) defines methodological whiteness as a way of reflecting on the world that fails to acknowledge the role played by race in the very structuring of that world, and of the ways in which knowledge is constructed and legitimated within it. It fails to recognize the dominance of ‘Whiteness’ as anything other than the standard state of affairs and treats a limited perspective – that deriving from White experience – as a universal perspective. Operating in supposedly neutral and universal terms, methodological whiteness naturalizes the racial status quo, eliding the crucial role of racism in political systems or intellectual traditions. [Bertrand (2018)](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921) has critiqued securitization theory’s methodology for setting up a colonial relation wherein subalterns cannot speak and securitization theorists speak for them. Our critique is somewhat different: we argue that since securitization theory aspires to describe not just ‘what is’ but ‘what should be’, its methodological whiteness also becomes normative whiteness. To illustrate this argument, we evaluate securitization theory’s incorporation of speech act theory and ask how it interfaces with its civilizationist conceptualizations of politics and security. Securitization theory bases its methodology in J. L. Austin’s notion of illocutionary speech acts: forms of speech having some element of force, such as making a promise or giving a warning. Combining this with an Arendtian concept of politics seems intuitive: Arendt defined politics as action through communication, and Austin provides a method for analyzing communication as action. Notably, this methodology enacts a normative stance, being designed to ‘protect’ Arendtian normal politics: Securitization theory was built from the start on speech act theory, because it is an operational method that can be designed to protect politics in Arendt’s sense. Put in short form, the political conception of securitization theory is *inspired by Arendt, implemented through speech act theory*. ([Wæver, 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 122, emphasis in original) As we have seen, by defining violence as outside politics, Arendt failed to acknowledge that, by virtue of gender and racialization, some people are produced as the ‘raw materials’ of others’ political freedom. **When securitization theory claims that the purpose of its method is to protect Arendtian ‘normal politics’, it implicitly undertakes to defend the status quo of a violent international racial order.** To begin, we can observe that securitization theory does not challenge the ways in which structures of speech acts (like law, civil hierarchy, or international treaties) are and have been central to enforcing a colonial system of global inequality. On the contrary, securitization theory is structured, through its apparent neutrality, to supplement and reinforce those structures: Our relative objectivism on social relations has the drawback of contributing to the reproduction of things as they are, of contributing to the taking for granted that [critical security studies] wants to upset. The advantage is – totally in line with classical security studies – to help in managing relations among units. ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 206) While acknowledging this methodological and normative investment in maintaining the status quo as a ‘drawback’, the authors claim it is worth the price. ‘Managing relations among units’ – maintaining order – is a higher priority than justice. And how is order to be maintained? By preventing civilized ‘normal politics’ from ‘regressing’ into a ‘state of nature’: Austin gives us insights into the capacity of mankind [*sic*] for creating shared environments through language…. Herein lies *the power of human civilization, as opposed to the ‘state of nature’;* the power which alone makes it possible, on occasion, for someone weak and without weapons to be listened to and even obeyed, the power which makes it possible to conceive and pursue things such as social equality or solidarity and equal opportunities for genders, *all of which would not be conceivable in a ‘state of nature’ ethology*. To acknowledge in theory and investigate such power is at the same time to foster and defend it against the *regression into forms of social life based on brute force and coercion*. ([Wæver, 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 121, emphasis added) Although this passage avoids overt mention of race, it mobilizes a racial imaginary. Its argument is that through the use of language to form social contracts, civilized people lift themselves above the savage ‘state of nature’ and create a public political sphere. This superiority is evidenced by the capacity for (Western, liberal) discourses like ‘equal opportunities for genders’ (here, securitization theory echoes imperial feminism’s racist claim that gender equality is most advanced in the West and should be exported, especially to ‘Muslim’ societies). However, while traditional Hobbesian social contract theory views the social contract in quasi-legal terms as happening once for all in the past, securitization theory redefines it as continuously intersubjectively produced through speech acts, and therefore constantly in need of reproduction. For securitization theory, white Western superiority is therefore precarious: it must be protected from (excessive) securitization that risks a ‘regression’ to a lower level of civilization or a fully uncivilized ‘state of nature’. This passage does not merely retell a classic civilizationist narrative in newer philosophical language. *It operationalizes this narrative, making its assumptions into a method.* If the ability to do things with words and not force distinguishes civilized man, it argues, then to analyze ‘how to do things with words’ via Austin’s method must be *in itself* to step to the defense of civilized normal politics. Securitization theory offers a methodological procedure by which the scholar can observe that a speech act meets the criteria for ‘securitization’ and make normative statements about whether it should be heeded. For securitization theory, when we deploy this methodology, we inherently proceed in a civilized manner and so contribute to and protect illocutionary, Arendtian politics.

**ST praises policing – minimizes and ignores violence against indigenous, black, and Latin populations**

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19** --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

More strikingly still, Copenhagen School theorists view policing as a positive force: ‘In the West, the police are normally an institutionalized part of society that ensures continuous functioning’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 54). They praise the pacification role of the modern state ([Greenwood and Wæver, 2013](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 489) and ignore the longstanding use of police in defending class and racial inequality and (hetero)sexual mores ([Amar, 2013](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Browne, 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Davis, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [James, 2000](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Kelley, 2000](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Sexton, 2007](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Singh, 2016](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)), and violently occupying indigenous land ([Bell and Schreiner, 2018](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Byrd, 2011](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Dhillon, 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Fanon, 1963](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Nettelbeck and Smandych, 2010](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Razack 2015](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). Securitization theory also repeatedly refers to the US War on Drugs as a ‘niche securitization’ ([Buzan and Wæver, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 327–331, [2009](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 265). This minimizes the transnational history of antiblack violence perpetrated by the US state leading into the mass incarceration of black and Latinx people ([Davis, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [James, 2000](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Rodriguez, 2006](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)) and ignores American covert and counterinsurgency action globally, especially in Latin America. Policing ensures ‘good’ order for those privileged by whiteness, property ownership, gender norms, and/or settler status. The constitutive role of policing and law in the racial, (settler-)colonial, sexual, and class violence of ‘normal politics’ is occluded as a direct result of securitization theory’s reliance on civilizationist oppositions between politics versus security and politicization versus securitization.

**ST criminalizes racial justice movements as an act of securitization – sustains order over justice**

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19** --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

To illustrate the empirical consequences of this methodological and normative whiteness, consider how securitization theory refuses to distinguish between white nationalist and racial justice movements: The radical white categorizations often line up with the attempts of the avowed progressives of the movements of minorities, multiculturalism, and political correctness to produce a general U.S. trend toward a redefinition of cultural and societal categories in terms of distinct racial and gender groups. The one side wants these groups recognized to ensure affirmative action in favor of the disfavored; the other side wants to use these categories to picture minorities as the threat to them and thereby to the whole. ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 130) The above passage is not a mistake. Similar lines of thought are articulated elsewhere, for instance in relation to the threat of ‘radical feminism’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 54). Securitization theory frames racial justice and white nationalist movements as equivalent: both **potentially securitize cultural and racial categories**. This framing is a result of securitization theory’s methodological whiteness, its inability to ask questions about racialized, gendered, and (settler-)colonial orders, and its general **preference for order over justice**. It is also a normative stance. Securitization theory aims to use speech act theory to defend normal politics from (excessive) securitization, *including by racial justice movements.* Racial justice, by extension, becomes a danger, threatening regression into a (racially coded) lower level of civilization or, worse, primal anarchy.

**Criminalizes Justice**

**Securitization is fundamentally flawed – criminalizes those who advocate for social justice to justify securitizing “threats” – Milagro Sala proves**

**Selister Gomes and Rodrigues Marques, 21** --- Mariana Selister Gomes is an associate Professor of the Department of Social Sciences, of the Post-Graduation Program in Social Sciences and of the Post-Graduation Program in International Relations of the Federal University of Santa Maria. Collaborating Professor of the Post-Graduation Program in Sociology of the Federal University of Sergipe. Doctor in Sociology at the Lisbon University Institute. Master in Sociology by the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul and Bachelor in History by the same institution. Renata Rodrigues Marques is a teacher in International Relations at the Federal University of Santa Maria (UFSM). Graduated in International Relations from the same institution. Member of the GIDH Extension Project - Gender, Intersectionality and Human Rights and of the Feminist and Decolonial Research Methodology Research Project. (Mariana Selister Gomes and Renata Rodrigues Marques, "Can securitization theory be saved from itself? A decolonial and feminist intervention", 10-26-2021, SAGE Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)//EG

Despite the limitations set out above, securitization theory proves to be useful in enabling the analysis of power dynamics involved in state security discourses and the construction of threats as an instrument of state governmentality ([Opitz, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). Feminist approaches to security and decolonial feminism, in turn, complement structural analysis by exposing the modern state as a gendered and racialized construction. The second argument of this intervention is a defense of empirical studies as a way of overcoming the neglects of the classical perspective of securitization theory by analyzing how the dimensions of coloniality intervene in processes of securitization. To illustrate how an empirical turn can make the case for securitization theory, we present our research on the construction of racialized women who actively participate in political life as a threat to the governmentality of the modern state. Our investigation focused on the case of Milagro Sala, an indigenous woman who is the leader of the organization Tupac Amaru in Argentina and who was arrested in 2016. The organization is linked to several different ethnic groups, such as the Mapuche, the Guarani, and the Kollas. The objective of our study was to analyze how the process of securitization in this case is intertwined with processes of racialization and genderization. With this example, which reinforces the requirement for theoretical openness, we seek to demonstrate the importance of methodological openness and empirical research that employs the variables race and gender in studies of securitization processes. Sala was elected as a member of the Mercosur Parliament, the civil representation body of the trade bloc’s member-states, at the end of 2015, and arrested shortly afterwards, in January 2016, because she was perceived as being the ‘organizer’ of a protest in front of the seat of government in Argentina’s Jujuy province. Sala and other activists from Tupac Amaru were accused of several crimes in relation to their protest in Jujuy, and legal recognition of the organization was suspended by Executive Decree 402-G. We conducted our analysis of these events using content analysis and critical discourse analysis of political and media discourses. The political speeches we analyzed were from 13 statements and interviews published in the newspaper *La Nación* during 2016, given by the governor of Jujuy, Gerardo Morales, and by Argentina’s president, Mauricio Macri, as well as by official representatives and allies of their governments. We also analyzed the decrees that removed legal recognition and government funding for Tupac Amaru (Decree No. 402-G and Decree No. 403-G, promulgated in the ‘Official Diary’ of the province of Jujuy on 13 January 2016). From the analysis of the data, we identified the state as the main actor in the securitization process under study. We verified the state’s actions through an examination of: (i) the speeches of Gerardo Morales (provincial governor), Mauricio Macri (president of Argentina), and their coalition allies in their respective governments, which reinforce an image of both Sala and the Tupac Amaru organization as enemies of the population of Jujuy; and (ii) the executive decrees that criminalized the political demonstrations that were being held in front of the provincial government headquarters, which were published shortly after Morales took over the government of Jujuy province. Several international movements and organizations[1](javascript:popRef('fn1-09670106211027795')) denounced the criminalization of Tupac Amaru activists, highlighting the arbitrary arrest of Milagro Sala. This made it difficult to legitimize the process, but did not prevent the final decision of the state apparatus. Sala was sentenced to three years for the protest conducted outside the headquarters of the Jujuy government and barred from holding a position in any social organization. After her arrest, the Argentine government constantly tried to legitimize the process. Sala was granted house arrest after the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) requested a precautionary measure for her detention ([Rodríguez Niell, 2017](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). We therefore conclude that the actions of international organizations such as the IACHR had drawn attention to the case, which made it more difficult to establish the criminalization and securitization processes. However, the house arrest was revoked less than a month after its concession, and Sala subsequently returned to regular imprisonment. In relation to the gender variable, we observe that references to danger and violence were made more frequently in relation to Sala than to the organization as a whole. The statement that ‘she was the leader of an organization that politically managed a province’ was a constant (see, for example, [*La Nación*, 2016a](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). As a political leader, **Sala was constructed as being manipulative, dangerous, and violent – a treatment that reinforces the view,** highlighted by [Pateman (1988)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795), **that women should not be in the political space and, if they are, it is because they are not good women.** For our analysis, we also draw on fieldwork carried out by [Tabbush and Gaona (2017](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795): 315), who regard the actions against Tupac Amaru as an example of criminalization of ‘female activists who question entrenched racial, gender, and class inequalities in Latin America’ given the large numbers of women in leadership positions within the organization. [Tabbush and Gaona (2017](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795): 316) conclude that the persecution of the Tupac Amaru movement is related to ‘the circulation of radicalized hatred in a multi-ethnic society’, and that the government’s policy is based on an alleged need to ‘save’ the poor women and men who belong to the organization. In relation to the race variable, we observed that no explicit references were made to the indigenous issue and that Sala was not enunciated as an indigenous person in any of the political discourses we analyzed. This fact highlights deracialization as a form of securitization. This process by which ‘deracialization’ is used as a way to legitimize the criminalization of socially classified groups is related to what [Moffette and Vadasaria (2016)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795) perceive as the link between securitization and racial governmentality. As deracialization is not explicit in the speeches analyzed, we can only perceive its colonial dimensions when we approach the context – in this case, the construction of Latin America, the Argentine state and its whiteness policies. While Sala herself uses the rhetoric of race, referring to herself as black, and the organization of which she is a part has an indigenous name, the apparatus of power silences this dimension. In the Argentinian case, then, race intervenes to deracialize, to diminish the strength of the indigenous movement. Our findings thus contribute to the discussions about deracialization as an instrument of power, reinforcing the argument that Latin American ideas about miscegenation ([Martínez-Echazábal, 1998](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Van Dijk, 2005](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) were meant to hide racism and continue to be a method of silencing black and indigenous movements. Our findings thus appear to be relevant for several discussions about deracialization as an instrument of power in Latin America ([Briones, 2003](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Escolar, 2007](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Martínez-Echazábal, 1998](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Quijada et al., 2000](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Segato, 2010](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)), reinforcing the idea that ‘race’ was politicized by the state for purposes of homogenization, this time based on the concept of ‘mestizaje’. Whiteness played a strategic role in the project to homogenize the Argentine nation, where the participation of immigrants from Europe was extolled, while African and indigenous influences were rendered invisible in the nation’s historical-social and cultural construction. The imaginary that the nation is ‘plural’ at the same time that European descent is magnified can even be used as a resistance strategy when socially classified groups question pre-established categories of ‘race’ ([Escolar, 2007](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795): 104–105), but it mainly reflects the invisibility of the indigenous population. The term ‘ethnocidal miscegenation’ was coined to refer to a strategy to silence the participation of indigenous and Afro-Latino populations in Latin American societies that built the idea of ‘mestizaje’. The removal of racial/ethnic identifications in official population statistics and censuses in Argentina has been verified empirically by [López (2006)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795) and [Segato (2010)](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795). Against this background, we could observe in our results what has been identified as ‘silenced racialization’ of the indigenous population, whereby speech can be racialized even if such racialization is not done formally ([Briones, 2003](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795): 77). We also carried out an analysis of media discourse in order to assess the extent to which the securitization process had met with acceptance and been regarded as legitimate. Our analysis was centered on the newspaper *La Nación*, since this is a recognized source of information on Argentina and has dedicated specific sections to the case of Sala and Tupac Amaru. More than one hundred news stories from 2016 were analyzed. As in the political speeches, the threat posed by Sala and her leadership role were underlined – often appearing together, as occurred in 31 news stories. As an example, one of these reports, published four days after Sala’s arrest on 16 January 2016, states that ‘*thief, gangster* and *threatening* are three of the softest words people use to describe Milagro Sala when asked who she is’ ([*La Nación*, 2016b](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). The articles emphasized the organization’s ‘accumulated power’, and the idea that Tupac Amaru constituted a ‘parallel state’ in the province of Jujuy was also reiterated. We see in this a ‘**coloniality of security’** ([Lucero, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)) **that finds danger when communities inside the state practice any degree of self-determination, causing the state to perceive self-determination and difference as a threat.** Rooted in power relations, the media discourses that we analyzed play an important role in the securitization process since they articulate affective dimensions on which the social representations of Sala and the Tupac Amaru organization are built. **Sala is not represented as a woman who is the leader of an ethnic organization of political and territorial resistance, but as a violent and dangerous woman who has accumulated power in the province**. This establishes an affective dimension of aversion: given that a significant part of the Jujuy population identifies itself as indigenous ([Tabbush and Gaona, 2017](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)), the failure to identify the organization and its leaders as indigenous prevents any form of empathy from being built in relation to them. Our analysis also allowed us to perceive various discursive disputes present in the securitization process, mainly related to the fact that Sala is a woman, indigenous and a parliamentarian. The exposure by international organizations of the race and gender dynamics present in Sala’s imprisonment is constructed by the media as a defense ‘rhetoric’, as if the use of such terms represented an attempt to ‘cover up the crimes’ of Sala. Paradoxically, Sala is constantly described as a violent woman. The Tupac Amaru movement employs a strategy of acting transnationally in an attempt to ‘counter-balance’ its confrontation with the state and securitization in the domestic arena, a characteristic also seen in several other social movements in Latin America (see [López, 2006](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795); [Lucero, 2015](https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1177/09670106211027795)). In other words, our analysis showed that state authorities and the media engage in a silencing of the racial and gender dimension as a way of legitimizing the criminalization of the activities of Sala and Tupac Amaru, while international organizations and the Tupac Amaru organization itself emphasize these dimensions as a form of political resistance. Race and gender thus proved to be important variables that intervened in the process by which Milagro Sala was securitized – in ways that are not immediately obvious. The case analyzed here thus reinforces our argument about the need for empirical research on how the variables of gender and race interfere in securitization processes.

**Colonialist**

**The logic of securitization defends colonialism as an experiment to desecuritize and make continents like Africa more “Europeans”**

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19** --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

Does securitization theory overcome, replicate, or deepen antiblack thought on ‘Africa’? Certainly, securitization theory sees a tendency towards primal anarchy and the ‘state of nature’ in many non-Western parts of the world (the Balkans; Eastern Europe; Central, South, and East Asia; the Middle East; and South America), but ‘Africa’ is particularly maligned. Often, classic securitization theory treats the entire continent as a single entity, a space where normal politics is weak and oversecuritized, the state or social contract fails (or was never established), and ‘man’ reverts to (or never left) the state of nature. *‘Africa is a pessimist’s paradise, a place where the Hobbesian hypothesis that in the absence of a political Leviathan life for individuals will be nasty, brutish, and short seems to be widely manifest in everyday life’* ([Buzan and Wæver, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 219). Elsewhere, however, it adds some complexity by seeing Africa in terms of multiple temporalities, being both ‘premodern’, having elements of the ‘modern’, and threatening a ‘back to the future’ scenario. On the one hand, a book like *Regions and Powers* ([Buzan and Wæver, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)) offers a sweeping history of Europe over millennia (containing little mention of colonialism), but a history of Africa that covers only official decolonization and the post–Cold War era: a matter of mere decades. Completely missing is any historical account of how colonialism and enslavement shaped not only African but also European security relations ([Agathangelou and Ling, 2004b](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Barkawi, 2006](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Barkawi and Laffey, 1999](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Krishna, 2001](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)), and the idea of Europe itself ([Mudimbe, 1988](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Said, 1979](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). Conversely, another canonical securitization theory text asserts that ‘in the contemporary international system, some *prestate* referent objects are still active. The remnants of *tribal barbarians still exist* in parts of Central Asia and Africa. Some hint of how these tribes *worked* as referent objects for military security can be gleaned from contemporary civil wars in Afghanistan and Somalia’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 53, emphasis added). The past-tense ‘worked’ here implies that we can learn about premodern times (in Europe) by looking at present-day Afghanistan or Somalia, whose backwards ‘tribal barbarian’ populations constitute a *pre*state referent. These two temporalities come together in the statement that ‘in Africa, the main societal referent objects are a mix of premodern – the extended family, village, clan, and tribe – and modern, the “state-nation”’ ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 126). Securitization theory, then, sees Africa as temporally anomalous – that is, both premodern and modern – because it manifests both a postcolonial present and a potential degeneration to a precolonial/premodern past, as when [Buzan and Wæver (2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 221), drawing from other authors, including Kaplan, speculate that: the period of colonization and decolonization might, in the long view, appear as something of an interlude, a period with its own distinctive characteristics, rather than a point of permanent transformation from premodern to modern. If back-to-the-future pessimism is right, then what we are looking at now is some phase in the terminal collapse of the Westphalian experiment in Africa. This passage outlines a ‘back to the future’ scenario in which Africa returns to its default state of precolonial, tribal, anarchic statelessness. Here, as elsewhere, securitization theory does not entirely ignore histories of colonization: it admits that colonialism had an impact on Africa, but it understands this impact not as an extraction of resources and labor and a violent transformation of people into chattel, but **as an ‘experiment’ aimed at bringing the European Westphalian state to ‘premodern’ barbarians** (see [Buzan and Wæver, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 221; [Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 53, 126). Colonial and ongoing postcolonial and settler-colonial exploitation does not feature in this analysis, and decolonization appears not as a project of liberation but as a potential backslide into primal anarchy ([Buzan and Wæver, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 345). **For securitization theory, histories of colonialism look less like violent ongoing exploitation than a missed opportunity for Africa to become more modern, desecuritized, and European.** Why is ‘Africa’ missing this opportunity? Securitization theory’s methodological whiteness leads it to assert, without substantiation, that the cause of this backsliding must be not the ongoing extractive violence of liberal powers but the failure of African people and states to ‘desecuritize’: Because political violence has been such an endemic feature of the African landscape, and because the crisis of the African state is so central to the pervasive insecurity on the continent, we will take the existence of systematic political violence to indicate the presence of a dominant securitization. ([Buzan and Wæver, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 223) This is strikingly circular reasoning, where premises and conclusions guarantee each other. Securitization theory starts, as we have seen, from the axioms that ‘normal politics’ tames violence and irrational securitizations threaten ‘normal politics’. Seeing Africa as a violent, anarchic space, lacking in ‘normal’ civilized politics, securitization theory assumes this must be because securitization has run amok. As a result, **African ‘dominant securitization’ can be taken for granted, as a foil to the supposed peacefulness of Europe**, and therefore as evidence that ‘normal politics’ tames violence, and so on. Securitization theory here turns an antiblack narrative of African (a)history (Africa is primitive, violent, anachronistic) into an equally antiblack normative proposition: that Africa is culpable for failing to produce ‘normal politics’. European colonial violence is occluded or, worse, exonerated: many African elites publicly embraced a negative view of globalization, and took the view that their weak position in the global periphery was a major explanation for their difficulties. This led to a convenient rhetoric of ‘neo-colonial’ securitization that sought, often successfully, to divert attention from the indigenous causes of Africa’s difficulties. ([Buzan and Wæver, 2003](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 251) This not only sanitizes the violence of colonialism and enslavement, it goes so far as to cast **anti-colonial politics as the problem**.[4](javascript:popRef('fn4-0967010619862921'))

**Desecuritization fails**

**Desecuritization fails – foundations laid will always be replaced by new threats**

**Maas, 13** --- Matthijs Maas is a postdoctoral research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER), University of Cambridge. (Matthijs Maas, "Desecurity Will Not Save Us: Securitization Studies, the Problem of 'Normal / Democratic' Politics, and the Limits of Desecuritization as Normative-Political Panacea", 16/8/13, The University of Edinburgh, https://www.academia.edu/8086735/Desecurity\_Will\_Not\_Save\_Us\_Securitization\_Studies\_the\_Problem\_of\_Normal\_Democratic\_Politics\_and\_the\_Limits\_of\_Desecuritization\_as\_Normative-Political\_Panacea)//EG

Briefly returning to the ‘operational’ critique which we touched upon previously, it is possible to also unpack this question of the ‘limits’ of desecuritization in a second, ‘strong’ sense—as indicative of a more *general* political irreducibility of ‘security’, which would have the rather significant implication that there is a *structural* impossibility—or at least, ‘net’ futility—to *any* strategy seeking to meaningfully ‘unmake’ security. While there have been a fair number of theorists (cf. Aras & Polat, 2008; Bilgin, 2006; Kim & Lee, 2010) who have traced instances of the desecuritization of one issue being intrinsically tied up with—or even predicated on—the shifting of the ‘security agenda’ to new threats in other sections, this line of argument has been taken the furthest in Behnke’s post-structuralist [2006] argument. The key claim he makes is that the ‘**replacement’ of de-securitized** issues with other, new securitisations is not coincidental and occasional, but in fact ***inevitable*** in the context of a level-one political ‘ontotheology’ [ibid] that is irredeemably constituted by the logic of security. Drawing on Campbell’s (1998) argument that states can only maintain ontological security, order, and national identity in contradistinction to an excluded ‘outside’ (or Other), Behnke argues that constant (re)production of a Schmittian (securitizing) logic is a *necessary* ingredient in all political community [2006:650], which implies that *meaningful* desecuritization cannot really happen (Behnke, 2007:109). We cannot, as it were, ‘gain ground’ against security, as every such attempt might merely be laying the foundations for the next security move. ‘Replacement’, while obviously not a ‘strategy of desecuritization’ (indeed, if anything it is the opposite), is nonetheless of key interest for the significant analytical and normative implications it has. In a straightforward sense, it should make analysts more suspicious of cases that on the surface *appear* to be straightforward examples of successful 31 desecuritization—but which on closer examination reveal the complex machinery of security at work, suggesting that this ‘desecuritization’ in one sector might perhaps be more accurately understood as merely the side-product of a counter-securitisation—or even a *meta-* securitization—in another sector (cf. Williams, 2003, 2011]. Furthermore, ‘replacement’ obviously has tremendous ramifications for the practical limits of desecuritization—and hence for the normative limits of both the CS, as well as that of many of its critics, as it suggests that even if desecuritization is achievable within specific cases and contexts, no political sphere is- or can be completely ‘de-securitized’. Nevertheless, even if are to concede the political irreducibility of security, and accept that desecuritization will at best leave state elites with a temporary ‘threat deficit problem’ [Buzan, 2006:6], it seems a stretch to conclude from this that desecuritization is entirely ‘meaningless’ politically. Instead, as also noted by Hansen (2012:541-542), we might take this opportunity to interrogate the differential *effects* of different forms of ‘otherness’, and whether trading in one securitisation for another, even if it fails to maintain ‘normal politics’, will only involve a substantive realignment of ‘threats’ within a self-same ‘war logic’, or whether the transfer could even be a desirable, qualitative one, towards a more reflexive or ‘stable’ securitisation.65

**Desecuritization fails – wipes issues off the political agenda which undermines democratic decision making and marginalizes subjects**

**Maas, 13** --- Matthijs Maas is a postdoctoral research associate at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk (CSER), University of Cambridge. (Matthijs Maas, "Desecurity Will Not Save Us: Securitization Studies, the Problem of 'Normal / Democratic' Politics, and the Limits of Desecuritization as Normative-Political Panacea", 16/8/13, The University of Edinburgh, https://www.academia.edu/8086735/Desecurity\_Will\_Not\_Save\_Us\_Securitization\_Studies\_the\_Problem\_of\_Normal\_Democratic\_Politics\_and\_the\_Limits\_of\_Desecuritization\_as\_Normative-Political\_Panacea)//EG

Significantly, if ‘securitisation’ can, in one sense, be understood as an ‘extreme version of politicization’ [Buzan, Waever & de Wilde, 1998:23], it might be suggested that the inverse also holds—that is, extreme versions of ‘desecuritization’ may effectively entail the wholesale *de-politicization* of issues. This final and arguably most problematic form of desecuritization is found in the phenomenon of ‘silencing’ [Floyd, 2007; Mackenzie, 2009; Hansen, 2012], which is when a formerly securitised issue is moved out of the ‘security agenda’, but rather than becoming *politicized*, it is *de*-politicized, vanishing from political discourse as it is dropped below the public discursive radar (Hansen, 2012:544-545). Such a process has been demonstrated, amongst others, in Mackenzie’s (2009) study of the systematic and gendered ‘exclusion’ of former female soldiers from the post-conflict reintegration programs in Sierra Leone, which effectively “removed them from significant policy discourses’ [Mackenzie, 2009:257]. Similarly, in her study tracing the Bush-era ‘desecuritization’ of environmental security, Floyd (2007:347) identifies how certain forms 65 Say, replacing the threat of ‘migrants’ with ‘environment’; although such evaluations do seem implicitly to require substantive consideration [cf. Floyd, 2011]. page35image1056783280 32 of desecuritization do not [re]politicize the issue, but rather wipe it off the political agenda altogether. As noted by Hansen, ‘desecuritization-as-silencing’ is, of all forms of desecuritization, the one “that stretches securitisation theory the most” [2012:545], both *analytically,* in that ‘silent desecuritizations’ cannot be studied within a framework grounded 66 but especially *normatively.* After all, whereas politicizing an issue allows for more democratic (and, in the CS view, more felicitous) decision-making, silencing actively yet covertly works as a ‘strategy of exclusion’ that marginalizes and obscures ‘potentially insecure subjects’ [ibid.2012:544-545], further disadvantaging them and denying them any political recognition. Such a move should be of obvious *tactical* interest as a ‘strategic time-out’ that enables political actors to “...depoliticise in ways that facilitate the long term goal of a political bargaining sphere” (ibid.535). However, as it is inherently anti-democratic, and as, by perpetuating the insecurity of marginalized but voiceless actors, it risks laying the foundations for future (re)- securitizations,67 ‘desecuritization-as-silencing’ appears, if anything, the ethical *antithesis* of ‘proper’ desecuritization, whether conceived in deontic or consequentialist terms.

**Desecuritization seeks to promote the development of western society and create a white prescription for the world**

**Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 19** --- Alison Howell is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark, where she is also an affiliate member of Women's and Gender Studies, the Division of Global Affairs, and Global Urban Studies. She previously held research fellowships at the Humanitarian and Conflict Response Institute (HCRI) and in Politics, both at the University of Manchester, as well as a Fulbright at Brown University and SUNY. Dr. Melanie Richter-Montpetit is Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Director of the Centre for Advanced International Theory (CAIT). Before joining the University of Sussex, Dr. Richter-Montpetit worked as a Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sheffield. (Alison Howell and Melanie Richter-Montpetit, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", 8-7-2019, SAGE Journals, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)//EG

The normative goal of securitization theory is to protect ‘normal politics’ though civilized illocutionary action in favor of desecuritization, where **desecuritization is constantly understood as synonymous with ‘progress attached to the development of Western international society’:** Progress as desecuritization [has been] inherent in the liberals’ project since the nineteenth century…. This project has been taken the *furthest* in the ‘zone of peace’ that now characterizes Western international society…. With the demise of the Communist counterproject and the closed states and societies associated with it, the prospect exists for a more widespread dissolving of borders, desecuritizing most kinds of political, social, and economic interaction. This development is the *most advanced* within the EU, but it is also inherent in the shift from modern to postmodern states and from more closed to more open political constructions that is going on in many parts of the world. ([Buzan et al., 1998](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921): 209, emphasis added) To describe the 19th-century, golden age of European imperialism as a period of Western liberal progress is to dramatically misapprehend the historical record (see [Barkawi and Laffey, 1999](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Grovogui, 2001](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921); [Krishna, 2001](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)). To equate the growth of Western imperialist hegemony with ‘desecuritization’ is even worse. It is not only to retroactively sanitize white supremacist imperialist history, but also to further insist that it ought to continue. In this sort of normative claim, securitization theory’s racism becomes operative, moving from a white methodology that describes the world from ‘a limited perspective – that deriving from White experience’ ([Bhambra, 2017](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0967010619862921)), to a normatively **white prescription for how the world ought to be.**

**Desecuritization’s depiction of security as a failure of normal politics serves the interests of those who benefit from negative depictions of threats and silences alternate visions of security**

McDonald, 08 --- International Relations, University of Queensland (Matt McDonald, " Securitization and the Construction of Security", 12/1/08, Sage Journals, https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066108097553)//EG

In the securitization framework, the study of security is ultimately the study of the designation of threat. In this framework, an issue is a security issue if European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 578 positioned as a threat to a particular political community. This commitment to the study of ‘threats’ is based on a commitment to the idea that security is constituted in oppositional terms: by designating that which it is not or that from which it needs preservation or protection (Wæver, 1995: 56). Such a commitment is consistent also with the oppositional conception of identity in the securitization framework, wherein who we are is determined by the designation of (threatening) others.21 In short, we can learn all we need to know about the construction of security through studying the issues that are represented as existential threats. As Michael Williams (2003) has suggested, this oppositional view of the politics of security is related to the Copenhagen School’s indebtedness to the political theory of Carl Schmitt. For Schmitt, politics in general is characterized by enmity and exclusion, with the sovereign’s designation of threatening ‘others’ central to political life and allowing the ‘exception’: the suspension of the normal rules of politics. For the securitization framework, such a vision of politics is particularly applicable to the realm of security, which is characterized by the articulation of threat and ‘emergency measures’ enabled by that articulation. The Copenhagen School suggests that this political dynamic captures something timeless about the logic of security itself, with the realm of security an arena of exclusion and ‘panic politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 34). This view of the logic of security has been central to their call for desecuritization, a point I will return to in a moment. Representations of threat — pivotal to Schmittian security politics — can of course be viewed as constitutive of security and identity. As Simon Dalby has argued, the designation of that from which we need to be protected is crucial in telling us ‘who we are, what we value and what we are prepared to countenance to protect our self-preferred identities’ (Dalby, 2002: xxx). But is this the only way in which security is constructed, and what do we miss through focusing only on the designation of threat? I suggest here that while central, a focus on the designation of threat alone risks missing much about the construction of security, especially through privileging the ‘content’ of security over its meaning in particular contexts. As noted, Roxanne Lynn Doty (1998/9) has suggested that radically different approaches to immigration can be understood in the context of different discourses of security. For Doty, changing approaches to the treatment of Haitian refugees by the US government in the 1990s can primarily — and contra the Copenhagen School — be understood as a change in the way security itself was understood. And I have suggested elsewhere (McDonald, 2003) that significant change in the Brazilian government’s approach to Amazonian deforestation in the late 1980s — from conceptualizing the intact rainforest as a threat to Brazil to positioning it as that in need of being protected as part of Brazil — can be better understood as a change in perceptions McDonald: Securitization and the Construction of Security 579 or discourses of security rather than as an instance of ‘de-securitization’. Here, articulations of the values in need of being protected were more prominent — and I would suggest more politically significant — than articulations of ‘from what or whom we need protection’. The focus on the designation of threat alone therefore tells a partial story of how security is given meaning, marginalizing inclusive and non-statist definitions of ‘our values’ that tell us how security is understood in particular contexts.22 More problematically, the Copenhagen School image of security as acquiring meaning (or more accurately content) through the articulation of threat arguably works only to the extent that security is fixed in a Schmittian logic based on exclusion and exception.23 The ‘fixedness’ of the Copenhagen School’s logic of security has been taken up by ‘Welsh School’ critical security theorists, for whom the study of security should be geared towards recognizing and advancing opportunities for emancipation of the most vulnerable. Ken Booth (2005: 207) and Paul Williams (2004: 144), for example, have suggested that the securitization framework is parasitic upon traditional (Realist) discourses of security that are taken as indicative of a universal and timeless logic of security. This is evident, for these theorists, in the Copenhagen School’s commitment to strict boundaries of inclusion and exclusion; to the state and state political leaders’ centrality in defining (usually external) threats and responses to them; and to the association of security means and tools with the most significant of ‘emergency measures’: military action. This constitutes an important normative problem, arguably serving to reify and normalize these traditional statist, exclusionary and militaristic approaches to security. Indeed, the idea that the Copenhagen School’s logic of security is both relatively fixed and politically conservative is a feature of even sympathetic readings of the securitization framework (Huysmans, 1998: 500–1; Hansen, 2000: 286). In this context, key proponents of the Copenhagen School (Wæver, 1995; 2000: 253; 2004; Buzan et al., 1998: 204–9) have argued in favour of desecuritization: the removal of issues from the security agenda. While recognizing the possibility for securitization to be progressive (eg Wæver, 2000: 285), the general suggestion is that ‘it is better . . . to aim for desecuritization’ (Buzan and Wæver, 1998: 4). Here, the Schmittian logic of security can be avoided and issues returned to the open and deliberative realm of normal politics. Important issues surface again here about what constitutes normal politics and about the relatively simplistic distinction between ‘security’ and ‘politics’. Analytically, it is certainly possible to suggest that rather than constituting the opposite realm to that of politics, debates around what constitutes security and how ‘we’ should act to achieve or preserve it are particularly politically intense, even a form of ‘hyper-politics’. The logic of security upon which the securitization framework is based might be contested again here, 579 European Journal of International Relations 14(4) 580 most prominently the suggestion that security ‘speech acts’ can themselves take issues outside the political realm. But the suggestion that we should aim for ‘desecuritization’ is also normatively problematic. It **depicts security as a failure of ‘normal politics’ rather than recognizing security as a site of contestation and therefore for** (even emancipatory) **change**. This is especially important if security is still that most powerful of political categories — defining political priority, a community’s identity and its core values. The focus only on the negative designation of threat **serves the interests of those who benefit from dominant negative and exclusionary articulations of threat in contemporary international politics**, further **silencing voices articulating alternative visions for what security means and how it might be realized.**

**Realism true**

**Realism is more relevant than ever – Ukraine proves   
Walt, 22 ---** columnist at Foreign Policy and the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University (Stephen M. Walt, "The Ukraine War Doesn’t Change Everything", 4-13-2022, Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/13/ukraine-war-realism-great-powers-unipolarity/)//EG

Whatever the outcome, many observers believe the war will have a [profound effect on the broader condition of world politics](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/04/war-ukraine-turning-point-history/). They see the war in Ukraine as a watershed moment: a giant fork in the road. If Russia loses big, the “liberal world order” will get a new lease on life and the forces of autocracy will suffer a setback. If Putin ekes out some sort of win, however, they foresee a [dark slide toward the totalitarian abyss](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-04-01/francis-fukuyama-liberalism-country). Existing norms against the acquisition of territory by force will be eroded, and other autocrats will presumably be empowered to launch similar campaigns whenever the geopolitical stars align in their favor. I see it differently. The war in Ukraine **is** a significant event, but **not because the outcome will have a dramatic independent effect on the global balance of power or the normative environment that states have constructed** (and sometimes adhere to). Rather, it is important because it signals the end of the brief “unipolar moment” (1993-2020) when the United States was the world’s sole genuine superpower and because it heralds a return to patterns of world politics that were temporarily suppressed during the short era of unchallenged U.S. primacy. The end of that era was in sight long before Russia invaded Ukraine, however, and the war itself is more of a punctuation mark. (For a similar take, see Stephen Kotkin [here](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/review-essay/2022-04-06/cold-war-never-ended-russia-ukraine-war).) I am less inclined to see the war in Ukraine as a transformative moment because I’ve heard that song too many times in recent decades. We were told that “everything had changed” when the Berlin Wall came down, the Soviet Union imploded, and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. A new world order was at hand, the “[cynical calculus of pure power politics simply [did] not compute](https://www.nytimes.com/1992/10/02/us/the-1992-campaign-excerpts-from-speech-by-clinton-on-us-role.html),” mankind had supposedly reached the “[end of history](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_End_of_History_and_the_Last_Man),” and liberal capitalist democracy (preferably the American version) was now the only game in town. But then “everything changed” again on Sept. 11, 2001, and we were suddenly in a “global war on terror,” which some [overwrought analysts](https://www.amazon.com/World-War-IV-Struggle-Islamofascism/dp/0307386023) tried to repackage as “[World War IV](https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1006219259392114120).” But hold on! “Everything changed” yet again when financial markets collapsed in 2008 and Wall Street’s “masters of the universe” were revealed to be gullible, fallible, and corrupt. And then “everything changed” once more when Donald Trump became president and began trampling every norm in the U.S. political playbook. So forgive me if I have trouble seeing the war in Ukraine as a decisive turning point in the history of humanity. For all the damage and suffering that have already occurred, it has a long way to go before it reaches the levels of destruction wrought by the wars in Indochina, between Iran and Iraq, or in [central Africa](https://www.amazon.com/Africas-World-War-Continental-Catastrophe/dp/0199754209)—or by the [U.S. campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan](https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/papers/summary). The war could still get there, of course—especially if weapons of mass destruction are used—but the odds are against it (a prediction that I fervently hope turns out to be correct). More importantly, what is different about the current war is that for the first time since the early 1990s—but hardly the first time in history—there are rival great powers on the opposite sides of a major war. But this is a reversion to familiar patterns of great-power conflicts (and proxy wars) and not something novel or unique. As suggested above, this war is more accurately seen as marking the official end of the brief quasi-peace that followed the end of the Cold War. War didn’t disappear in that period—the United States fought in a bunch of them and started several—but the conflicts during this period were either civil wars, wars between minor powers, gross mismatches between major powers and minor powers, or some combination of all three. Direct great-power competition was muted because neither Russia nor China was strong enough to openly resist the United States. Dartmouth College political scientist William Wohlforth was partly right when he wrote of the “[stability of a unipolar world](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2539346)”: Few countries wanted to face the “focused enmity” of the United States or take actions that might bring the United States into the game in opposition. Where Wohlforth erred was his prediction that unipolarity might last even longer than Cold War bipolarity. That misjudgment was not entirely his fault, however, as he could not have foreseen the repeated blunders that hastened the end of the unipolar era. U.S. primacy and unipolar stability would have lasted longer if U.S. policymakers had been smarter, less ideologically driven, and more realistic (in every sense of that term). If Ukraine retains all or most of its former territory, it will be because of the hard power its citizens employed (with lots of outside help) to stop its larger neighbor. Instead of preserving U.S. power, resolving conflicts wherever possible, and working to ensure that no peer competitor emerged, U.S. officials mostly did the exact opposite. They [helped China rise more rapidly](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-19/inevitable-rivalry-cold-war) and squandered trillions of dollars in [costly and misguided crusades in the greater Middle East](https://www.amazon.com/Americas-War-Greater-Middle-East-ebook/dp/B0174PRIY4). Instead of extending liberal institutions gradually through mechanisms such as the Partnership for Peace, they expanded NATO with scant regard for Russian concerns and blithely assumed that Moscow could or would do nothing to stop it. Instead of taking a more measured approach to globalization and making sure its benefits were widely shared inside the United States, they embraced neoliberal approaches to global trade and investment and did not do enough to insulate endangered sectors of the U.S. workforce from globalization’s consequences. And instead of working overtime to make American democracy a model that other societies might want to emulate, U.S. politicians—and here I refer primarily to the Republican Party—repeatedly trampled on the principles and norms that are essential for true democracy to survive. The unipolar moment was never going to last forever, but repeated sins of omission and commission—for which no one was ever held accountable—brought it to a premature end. So where will this leave us? In the immortal words of Talking Heads: “[Same as it ever was, same as it ever was](https://youtu.be/5IsSpAOD6K8?t=104).” First, it is a world where hard power still matters, as everyone has now been reminded. If Russia succeeds in incorporating the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and a land bridge to Crimea, it will be because its military forces were able to accomplish that mission despite their earlier miscalculations and missteps. If Ukraine retains all or most of its former territory, it will be because of the hard power its citizens employed (with lots of outside help) to stop its larger neighbor. If the much ballyhooed “norm against conquest” gets reinforced, it will not be because Putin suddenly remembered that norms ought to be followed but because the combination of Ukrainian nationalism and effective weaponry proved too much for Moscow to overcome. Second, the world has been reminded—again!—that economic interdependence is not without risks and trade-offs. Markets surely matter, but politics matter more. Connecting the world through trade, investment, complex supply chains, and gas pipelines brought obvious and enormous benefits, but tight economic links are not an ironclad barrier to conflict and being dependent on others can cause real pain if those ties get sundered, whether by a dangerous virus or a sudden geopolitical fissure. Looking ahead, most states and most firms are going to sacrifice some amount of economic efficiency for the sake of redundancy and resilience. Economic growth will be lower than it might have been otherwise, but disruptive shocks will occur less often and states and firms will be less vulnerable to economic pressure. When forced to choose between security and profits, most countries will choose the former. Third, even if Russia achieves some limited gains in the Donbass, the war will accelerate its relative decline. Putin may prevent Ukraine from ever joining NATO, but the long-term consequences of that achievement will leave Russia worse off as a whole. Unless he erects a new Iron Curtain, [talented young Russians will continue to leave](https://nationalpost.com/news/under-putin-russia-seeing-an-exodus-of-the-most-educated-most-active-most-entrepreneurial-people). State revenues will decline as more and more countries wean themselves off Russian oil, gas, and coal. Ukraine will continue to move toward Europe economically, a [process that was already underway](https://vis.csh.ac.at/12-facts-ukraine-rus-eu/) before the war began. If Putin does achieve “victory” in Ukraine—which is by no means certain—it will be a Pyrrhic one. Russia’s autocracy may be more secure but less consequential. The world of the future will be closer to true bipolarity than lopsided multipolarity, with Russia playing the role of China’s junior partner (and one whose economic vitality and long-term strategic value may be diminishing). It won’t help Beijing’s image to be closely linked to Russia’s destruction of Ukraine, and Moscow could need more propping up as Russia’s economy falters and its population ages and shrinks. The emerging future will be neither a U.S.-centered “liberal order” nor a Chinese-centered autocratic one. Instead, [each of these two major powers will lead partial orders](https://direct.mit.edu/isec/article/43/4/7/12221/Bound-to-Fail-The-Rise-and-Fall-of-the-Liberal) that incorporate states that either share similar values or have little choice but to align with one side or the other. And make no mistake: Both Washington and Beijing are going to expect a lot of loyalty from some of their allies. Expect to see greater division and contention in the digital space as the two countries compete to determine which technical standards will predominate and as the digital world gradually segments behind firewalls, safeguards, incompatible privacy standards, and other restrictions. **We are back in a world that realism explains best, one where great powers compete for power and influence and others adapt as best they can.** But as the [global response to Ukraine suggests](https://twitter.com/kaa_richter/status/1511687026319503364), many countries—especially those in the global south—will resist pressures to pick a side and will try to remain aloof from quarrels that do not involve them directly. Some of them will try to extract greater benefits by playing the United States and China off against each other. Among other things, this situation is a reminder that trying to base U.S. foreign policy on a rigid dichotomy of “[democracy vs. autocracy](https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/05/autocracy-could-destroy-democracy-russia-ukraine/629363/)” is a [recipe for failure](https://twitter.com/MMazarr/status/1509643245013377027). As in the past, success will require cooperating with like-minded partners where possible and with states that do not share U.S. values when necessary. Unfortunately, cooperation among the major powers is going to be a lot harder to achieve and sustain, even when their interests are partly aligned. This could be the most significant fallout from this nasty but thus far localized war: It gives major powers the excuse to ignore the less imminent but far more ominous danger of [accelerating climate change](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/resources/press/press-release/). Dealing with climate change is going to require sacrifices by all the major powers, but they will be less willing to make them when they are worried about the global balance of power and are reluctant to give up more than their rivals. We are back in a world that realism explains best, one where great powers compete for power and influence and others adapt as best they can. The jungle isn’t “growing back,” as [Robert Kagan would have us believe](https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/576193/the-jungle-grows-back-by-robert-kagan/); it never really went away, even when the United States was the biggest beast and deluded itself into thinking it could make all the other animals behave. That’s not a particularly happy thought, but the world that realism depicts is not a particularly happy world.